The Civil War by Bob Blaisdell

Author:Bob Blaisdell
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Dover Publications
Published: 2006-01-15T00:00:00+00:00

Letter after Antietam from President Lincoln to Major-General George B. McClellan

(October 13, 1862)

[ALLT:282–285|

After the President's initial admiration for him and support for his advancement as the leader of the army in 1861, McClellan never followed through in the manner in which Lincoln expected or desired, and McClellan never respected the President's intelligence or political views. With the Confederate retreat after Antietam, Lincoln took advantage of the good news of this "victory" to announce on September 22 his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which policy McClellan disliked. While Lincoln cajoled him on military matters, the proud and touchy McClellan resented any second-guessing, polite and discreet as it was. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton remarked of McClellan: "If he had a million men he would swear the enemy has two millions, and then he would sit down in the mud and yell for three. "

EXECUTIVE MANSION

Washington, D.C., October 13, 1862

Major-General McClellan:

My dear Sir: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord.

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